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Summary  findings
After decades of heavy trade restrictions, fiscal  They address each of these questions using a cost
distortions, and currency overvaluation, Cameroon  function decomposition applied to detailed firm-level
implemented important  commercial and fiscal policy  panel data.
reforms. Almost simultaneously, a major CFA  They observe that Cameroon's  reforms appear to have
devaluation cut the international price of Cameroon's  sent clear new signals to manufacturers, as the effective
currency in half.  rate of protection fell by between 80 and 120 percentage
Gauthier, Soloaga, and Tybout examine the effects of  points.
these reforms on the incentive structure that  Unlike trade liberalization, neither tax reforms nor the
manufacturing firms face. Did they create a coherent  set  CFA devaluation had a major systematic effect on profit
of new signals? Was the net effect to stimulate the  margins. But the CFA devaluation did twist relative
production  of tradable goods? Was the dispersion of tax  prices dramatically in favor of exportable goods, so
burdens lessened?  export-oriented  firms exhibited rapid output growth.
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Union  Douaniere  et Economique  de l'Afiique  Centrale  (UDEAC).1.  Overview
Upon gaining  independence  in 1960,  Cameroon  adopted  an interventionist
approach  to industrialization  and development.  Its commercial  policies  kept import
prices high,  while its tax code selectively  promoted  certain  firms  and penalized  others.
These policies  continued  into the late 1980s  and early 1990s,  when the distortions  they
created  were compounded  by significant  currency  overvaluation  in the CFA
(Communaute  Financiere  Africaine)  2one,  of which  Cameroon  is a member.  Finally,  in
the face of crisis,  the CFA countries  agreed  to devalue  in 1994.  Almost  simultaneously,
Cameroon  implemented  significant  commercial  policy  reforms  and attempted  to level the
playing field by reducing  tax system  inequalities.
This paper examines  the effects  of these reforms  on the incentive  structure  faced
by manufacturing  firms.  Did they  create  a coherent  new set of signals?  Was their net
effect  to stimulate  the production  of tradable  goods?  Was dispersion  in tax burdens
lessened?  We address  each of these questions  using annual  survey  data collected  by the
Regional  Program  on Enterprise  DevAlopment  (RPED),  along with product-specific
prices and quantities  subsequently  collected  from a subset  of the RPED sample.'
The strength  of our analysis  l.es in the information  at our disposal.  For each  type
of tax and tariff, the firms  in our sample  reported  the amounts  they paid before and after
the reforms.  Further,  because  we re-visited  the sample  firms  to collect  price and quantity
information  on their major inputs  and1  outputs,  we are able  to impute  the effects  of tariffs
Further  details  on  the  RPED  surveys  n Cameroon  may  be  found  in  Gauthier  (1995).  Information  on
the  follow-up  surveys  is provided  in l'ybout et al (1997).
2on input prices from official tariff schedules for firms that that did not directly import the
intermediate goods they used. We are also able to gauge the relative importance of each
input and output to each producer. In sum, the data provide a far more detailed basis for
inference than is typically available.  2
To organize our analysis, we use a cost function decomposition. Fiscal and
commercial policy reforms are treated as influencing the effective prices of inputs and
outputs faced by firns;  their net effects are then calculated in terms of the changes they
induced in costs per unit revenue, firm by firm. Assuming that international trade
determines the border prices of all inputs and outputs, our calculations capture all the
effects of Cameroon's fiscal and commercial policy reforms on the incentive structure
and firms' gross profit margins. 3
By using a cost function approach rather than input-output tables, we allow for the
possibility that firms are able to substitute away from inputs that become relatively
expensive, and toward inputs that become relatively cheap. Similarly, intra-firm
substitutions among final products are recognized. Our effective protection figures
therefore give a better measure of the true burden on producers than the traditional
calculations (see footnote 2).
2  Standard  effective  protection  measures  are based  on input-output  matrices  at the 2-digit  or 3-digit
level,  in combination  with  tariff  schedules  or international  price  comparisons  (e.g., Balassa,  1965).
Many  examples  of this  type of calculation  and further references  can be found  in the seven  volumes
of country  studies  produced  for the World  Bank's 'Liberalizing  Foreign  Trade" project. Michaley,
et al (1991)  summarize  the main  findings.
3  If this assumption  is too strong,  our calculations  isolate  only  the direct  effects  of policy  reforms  on
after-tax,  after-tariff  prices  of inputs  and outputs.  The general  equilibrium  effects  of the reforms on
pre-tax,  pre-tariff  prices  are not ignored;  they are lumped  in with  all other  residual  factors,  such as the
exchange  rate, that affect  relative  prices.
3The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the fiscal and commercial
policy regimes before and after the reform of 1994. Section 3 attempts to quantify the
effects of the commercial and policy reforms on the firms' unit costs from a firm-level
perspective. Section 4 introduces the data used in this paper, which are based on surveys
spanning the 1992/95 period. Section 5 presents our findings on the sources of change in
unit costs, and their relation to policy  Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2.  Tax and Commercial Policy Reforms
Until 1994, the Cameroonian government  relied heavily on selective tax and tariff
exemptions to promote industrial development.  This strategy began in 1960 when the
country enacted an Investment Code to attract foreign capital and encourage import-
substituting industrialization.  It was a.so shaped by the 1964 Treaty of Brazzaville, which
dictated a number of taxes and duties to be implemented in all UDEAC countries. 4
Subsequent to these events, the Camreroonian  government layered on additional special
tax schemes and exemptions. The cumulative effect was to create one of the most
complex and unfair systems of taxes and duties in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Under this pre-reform regime, firms that did not enjoy access to any of the special
programs'-UDEAC-wide  or Cameroonian-were  subject to a variety of direct and sales
taxes. Further, those that imported irLtermediate  goods were subject to four tariffs unless
they had special status. The overall :ariff structure was highly diversified, with rates
4ranging from 0 percent to 500 percent (World Bank, 1995, Appendix 6). The regime not
only encouraged evasion, it also provided considerable incentives for firms to seek
special treatment from the tax authorities. Such treatment was available to manufacturers
through a variety of mechanisms on a case-by-case basis. Appendix 1 provides details on
the direct and indirect taxes, tariffs, and special programs that prevailed in the pre-reform
period.
In January 1994, the government began to dismantle this system.  In several
decrees, it attempted to correct anti-trade biases by increasing the importance of domestic
taxes and reducing tariffs. It also attempted to reduce inequalities, distortions, corruption
a.mong  administrators, and incentives for evasion. 5 These reforms were motivated by
several objectives: (1) to comply with conditionality in a World Bank Structural
Adjustment Program; (2) to further the UDEAC objective of promoting regional economic
integration; and (3) to shore up tax revenues, which had been eroding as oil exports fell
and tax exemptions and evasion became increasingly prevalent. 6
The new policy regime included several components that affected external trade:
a)  The  four-types of tariffs were replaced by a unified single system known as the TEC
(Tarif extirieur commun), applicable to imports  from non-UDEAC countries.
4  UDEAC,  the Union  Douaniere  et Economique  de l'Afrique Centrale, is composed  of Cameroon,
the Central African  Republic,  Chad, Congo, Equatorial  Guinea  and Gabon  . It was formed in 1964
by the Treaty  of Brazzaville.
5.  In 1994,  more  than  50 percent  of the 200  finns interviewed  in the RPED  sample  said  they  had not  paid
their full  tax obligations  in the previous  fiscal  year.
6  Tax revenues  in 1992  amounted  to only 12.3 percent  of GDP, comapred  to a median  of 18.5
percent for other Sub-Saharan  African  countries  (World  Bank, 1994,  table A.2.)
5b)  Imports were classified into  four categories, with tariff rates ranging  from S percent
to 30 percent, compared with rate, ranging from 0 percent to 500 percent under the
previous system.
c)  A general preferential tariff was introducedfor trade between UDEAC countries,
with an initial rate fixed at 20 perc,ent  of the applicable TEC.'
Further, the reform essentially replace4d  the various sales taxes with a value-added tax and
eliminated most special privileges. (Appendix 1 provides details.)
Table 1: Coyverage  of Special Regimes
1992-93  1993-94  1994-95
Percentage offirms  enjoying at leest  64.8% (83)  60.9% (78)  14.1% (18)
one  special tax regime*
Privilegedfirms'  sales as a  98.5%  94.4%  29.5%
percentage of total sales
Privilegedfirms'  imports as a  99.1%  98.2%  74.0%
percentage of total imports
*The  number  of firms in each category  is given  in parentheses.  The total number  of firms = 128
Table 1 documents the coverage of special fiscal regimes within the RPED sample
before and after the reforms. Note tkat the proportion of manufacturing enterprises
enjoying fiscal privileges dropped fiom 64.8 percent to 14 percent over the two year
period, and the phase-out of privilegres  was equally dramatic when measured in terms of
sales. However, most of the major i]nporting firms continued to enjoy special privileges
after the reforms. Special regimes a)plied to 99 percent of the total value of sample
imports in 1992-93, and still applied to 74 percent in 1994-95. This pattern reflects the
This  rate was to be reduced  to 10 percent  on January 1 1996  and 0 percent  on January 1 1998.
6fact the major importers in Cameroon are large, and large firms continued receiving
privileges in 1994-1995.
If the reforms had bite, many firms that enjoyed special status in 1992-93 should
have borne a larger tax burden in 1994-95. To quantify this effect, Table 2 presents the
tax rates firms reported facing in each fiscal year. The firms are grouped as follows: those
in special programs (who lost most of their benefits), those with free trade zone status or
ad hoc agreements (some of whom retained their benefits), and firms operating under the
common law regime in 1992-93.
Table 2: Average Indirect Tax Rates for Different Categories of
Firms based on their 1992-93 Status*
1992-93  1993-94  1994-95
- ~  -
Sales  Taxes
Privilegedfirms
*  Special incentive programs (UDEAC and  8.4%  8.3%  14.9%
Cameroon)
*  Free trade zone or ad hoc agreements  10.9%  8.7%  16.5%
No privileges  10.3%  10.7%  16.0%
Privilegedfirms
*  Specialincentiveprograms(UDEACand  15.8%  17.8%  19.8%
Cameroon)
*  Free trade zone or ad hoc agreements  18.5%  ..  30.0%
No privileges  66.8%  52.4%  20.2%
*  The total number of firms is 128. Figures in parentheses  are averages  of 1994/95  sales
taxes (TCA)  weighted  by the ratio of value-added  to total sales, firrn  by firm.
7Firns  with special incentive programs in 1992-93 reported that they faced an
average sales tax rate of 8.4 percent in that year. However, in 1994/95 they were
confronted with an average quasi-value-added tax of 14.9 percent. Similar patterns
emerge for the free trade zone/ad hoc agreement group and the unprivileged group,
although their rates are generally not as favorable as those of the special program firms.
Therefore, although they saw their sales tax rates increase, the special program group
continually enjoyed a discount of several percentage points, and there was no obvious
tendency for this group to converge toward the others. (Whether the effective tax burden
increased or decreased must be analyzed in conjunction with figures on value-added, and
this will be done in the following section.)
With respect to customs, the rates faced by the firms that originally enjoyed
special programs increased from 15.S percent in 1992-93 to 19.8 percent in 1994-95 as
privileges were phased out. The free trade zone firms and firms with ad hoc arrangements
faced an even greater increase, with rates jumping from 18.5 percent to an average of 30
percent. This reflects the fact that mDre  than half the sample firms under these regimes
lost their privileges after 1992-93. Finally, for firms operating under the normal regime in
1992-93, the impact of the reform was major. Their customs rates fell from 66.8 percent
in 1992-93 to an average of 20.2 percent in 1994-95. Thus there is some evidence that the
tariff reforms tended to level the playing field.
3. Quantifying the Effects of Commercial Policy and Fiscal Reforms
Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate that the reforms did indeed change the level and
distribution of the tax burden.  However, they do not document the combined effects of
8these reforms on after-tax costs per unit revenue for individual firms. This is our next
objective. As in Tybout et al (1997), we begin with a cost function:
(1)  C = f(Q,PL,P,,PK,A)
Here C is the minimum attainable cost at output level Q, productivity level A, and the
vector of effective (after tax, after tariff) prices for intermediate goods, P,  labor, P,,  and
capital, PK. By Shepard's  lemma,  we have:
(2)  d)nC=(d)dInQ+s(dInP)+SL(dInPL)+SK(dln.P)+ (m  A dlnA,
where 1l is the elasticity  of output  with respect  to cost, or returns  to scale.  Normalizing  by
the value of output,  we obtain a decomposition  of the sources  of growth  in cost per unit
revenue:
dIn C-  d l(QPQ)= (n  -l)dlnQ+s 1 (dlnP 1 - dlnPQ)+sL(dInPL  -dln6Q)
(3)  - i9  I~~~~~eYn  A) +  SK(d  In PK - d In PQ  ) + ( a1id  In A
A second-order  Tomqvist  approximation  to this expression  in discrete  time is given  by:
AlnC-Aln(QPQ)=  (-l)AlnQ+s(AlnPI  -AInPQ)+s  (AlnP  -ALn PQ)
(4)  ±s,(lnPnC  ln
SK(A  In PK-AlnPQ)+(dnA  dInA
where  A is the difference  operator  for period  t versus  t-l and overbars  denote  cross-period
averages  of the associated  variable.
9Commercial  policy  affects  costs per  unit  revenue by  changing the  after-tariff
prices of inputs and outputs. Domes  :ic tax policy similarly affects input and output prices
net of taxes, and may further change after-tax costs through lump sum taxes such as the
patente  (see  Appendix  1). The ba.ance  of  this paper  is devoted to  quantifying  these
channels of transmission from policy reforms to the incentive structure at the firm level.
It  is  possible  that  commercial and  domestic  tax  policy  affect  the  efficiency
parameter, A.  Similarly,  if  there are  scale economies,  they may  affect unit  costs  by
changing the volume of output. 8 However these channels of transmission are empirically
intractable, and we will not attempt to measure them separately.
Linking prices  to policy.  Let us suppose for the moment that every good used or
produced by  Cameroon firms  is also  available  in  foreign markets,  and  that  arbitrage
between domestic and foreign goocds  is perfect. It is then straightforward to calculate the
effects of the fiscal and commercil  policy on the after-tax, after-tariff prices faced by
producers.
Specifically, under the pre-reform regime, directly imported inputs were subject to
tariffs  but not to sales taxes (t), while domestically produced inputs were subject to sales
taxes  but  not  to  tariffs.  Vith  perfect  arbitrage,  Cameroon  firms  paid
P1i  = Pli(l + t) = P,(I + aii  )  for the ith input, where P,i is the external price of this input,
P,i is the pre-tax price of the domestically produced version of input i,  r,l  is the tariff
8  Head and Reis (1999)  provide  a recmt survey  of the theoretical  channels  through  which commercial
policy  can affect scale efficiency.
10rate, and t is the sales tax rate. Analogously, after taxes, a Cameroon producer of the jth
output received  P,=  = PJ (1  + r,  )/ (1  +t)  per unit produced.
When Cameroon moved to a value-added tax, domestic and foreign purchases of
the ith input were effectively tax-free (albeit not tariff-free) because the value-added taxes
paid on these purchases  were rebated. But perfect  arbitrage implies that  the price  of
domestic inputs still matched the tariff-distorted world price:  P1i  = PJ,  (1+ ri).  Hence,
under the perfect arbitrage assumption, Cameroon's fiscal and commercial policy reforms
influenced input prices only by affecting tariff rates. On the other hand, in the product
markets, the new regime meant that Cameroon firms collected the tariff-distorted world
price adjusted upward by the value-added tax rate (v), P., (1  + t) = P* (1  + r,  )(I + v),  and
they kept  PQ,  =P*(+r).  So under the perfect  arbitrage assumption, moving  to  a
value-added  system  increased  the  after-tax  price  of  outputs  relative  to  inputs  by
eliminating the cascading effect of sales taxes.
Of  course,  perfect  arbitrage is  not  a  realistic  assumption  for  most  products.
Transaction costs and product differentiation will typically allow domestic and  foreign
varieties of the same good to exhibit different prices, and the response of these prices to
changes in commercial policy and the fiscal regime will doubtless depend on market of
origin. To deal properly with these problems, an extremely detailed computable general
equilibrium (CGE) model would be needed. No such models exist for Cameroon, nor is it
feasible to construct one.
11Because the general equilibri  um effects are too complex to disentangle, we isolate
the discrepancy between domestic arid  foreign prices in the endogenous scaling variables,
Ah, and 2A,, which apply to the ith input and thejth  output, respectively. Accordingly,
the effective price of the ith domestic input is P,  = PI,  A ,,  (I +  T ji  ) and the price of thejth
domestically produced output is eithzr PQ  APQ(1  + T0 ) /(1+t)  or
PQ 1 = A  Q,P*  (1  + rZ ), depending on whether the old or the new regime is in force. These
relationships are summarized in Table 3 below.
Table 3: Producer Prices (P,, PQ)  Under Alternative Regimes
Type of good  Market source/  Perfect Arbitrage  Imperfect Arbitrage:
Destination
Sales Tax Regime
Inputs (P,):  imported  P* (1 + T  )  P*  (1 + a  )
domestic  PI  = PI (I + r)  P  , P*(1  + r)
Outputs(PQ,)  PQ = PQ(1+ rQ)1/(1  +t)  PQ  =AQP* (I+ TQ)/(1+  t)
VAT Regime
Inputs (p,):  imported  P;(1+  I-)  P;(1 +  )
domestic  PI  P;*(1  +r)  PI =AIP;*(1 +  Z)
Outputs (PQ)  PQ  - P(1+  rQ)  PQ  =AQPQ(l+TQ)
Before we substitute these producer prices back into equation 4, we must deal
with the fact that firms use multiple inputs and produce multiple outputs. To this end, we
12use Tornqvist indices of the growth rates in effective input and output prices, which
amount to share-weighted aggregations of the growth rates in the prices of the individual
goods. Specifically, for intermediate inputs, we calculate
N  ~~N  N  N
A  PI =siAlnPi,  XsiAAln(PE)+  siAln(I+  rT 1 )+  s1Aln2(i,)
i=l  1=1  i=l  j=1
(5)
= AlnPi*  +Aln(l+  r,)+Aln(A,)
where  s,  is the share of expenditures on the ith input (inclusive of tariffs) in total
intermediate input costs, averaged across periods. Given that producers report prices paid
inclusive of tariffs, as well as tariffs paid, we observe both Pn  's  and  r,, 's, so the left-
hand side and the tariff component of the right-hand side can be isolated. However, we do
not have micro data on the external prices of each product, so we cannot disaggregate the
sum A  ln P* +A ln(,  ) .
Analogously, for effective output prices we write:
(6).
A  ln(P-)  = Aln(I + r)  + Aln(P)  - A)ln(l  +t)+  Aln(A.)
= ajA  ln(I +  ±Qj)  +  EijiAln(PQj)  - -ajAln(I + to)  + SajAln(A  )
j=l  j=l  j=1  j=1
It should be remembered from Table 3 that the sales tax is phased out between the initial
and the final period, so  Aln(l+tQ)amounts  to  -ln(lIt4),  where  t'  is the pre-reform
sales tax  rate.  Also,  as  with  effective input prices,  note  that  we  will  be  unable  to
distinguish the  effects of imperfect arbitrage from the  effects of  changes in external
prices.
13A generalized cost decomposition. Substituting these relative price expressions
into our unit cost decomposition (4) and writing costs and revenues as net of taxes, we
obtain:
(7)  AInC-  AIn(Qj)=  (,-  1-)AInQ+ EdlnC)  A) A
+s,1ln(I+r,)-A1n(l+rQ)
+ A  ln(1 + tQ)
+ s, [A In(P, 2A) - A In(PjAQ)I
+  s, [A  In  PL  - A  In(PjAQ)] +sK[A  ln(PK)  -A In(PjAQ)]
Here, the first line on the right-hand side reflects the scale and other efficiency effects
that we will treat as a residual; the second line reflects the direct effects of commercial
policy on unit costs, the third line reflects the direct effect of eliminating sales taxes, and
the last two lines reflect the change, in relative prices not directly related to commercial
policy or taxes. Of course, the general equilibrium effects of these policy changes come
partly through ARI,  AQ,  PL and PK--We are unable to isolate these indirect effects. Note
also that under the perfect arbitrage assumption, these last lines simply pick up changes in
wages and world prices.
Since we are unable to observe effective prices for capital services directly, we
will henceforth assume that they grow at the same rate as the pre-tariff rate of growth in
domestic output prices, A ln(P(2AQ). The last line then becomes a wage effect alone:
14(7') AInC-Aln(QP)=  (.  -1)AlnQ +(  lnC) Aln A  (residual efficiency effect)
+s1, A In(I + r, ) -A In(I  + TQ)  (effective protection effect)
+ A ln(l + to)  (tax reform effect)
+ s, [A In(P, i,)  - A ln(PQA,)] (relativepre  - taxprice effect)
+ s  [A In P,. - A ln(PQ 2Q)]  (relative cost  of labor effect)
Relation to Effective Protection Measures. The above formula is useful for
calculating levels of protection as well as growth rates. These can be obtained by setting
all initial protection rates to zero and measuring the increase in cost when actual
protection rates are imposed. However, to do this, it must be assumed that  i,  = AQ= 1,
and some assumptions must also be made about the expenditure shares that would have
prevailed if producers had faced zero tariffs.
One possibility is to assume that the elasticity of substitution among all
intermediate inputs is unity. Then the same shares prevail with and without tariffs, and
the tariff effect in second line of equation (7') becomes approximately
N
- =  - Es  .9 This expression is a variant of the standard effective
i=1
protection measure when expressed as a ratio to value-added per unit revenue:
N
TQ-  r,
. The most common alternative approach is to presume there are no
1-Es
i=l
substitution possibilities at all among intermediate inputs. Then the translog cost function
9  This follows because ln(I +x)  _  x for small x values.
15is a poor approximation  to technology,  and effective  protection  calculations  are best done
using input shares  based on internatioaal  prices.
Lump-sum  Taxes.  Finally,  we must  adjust our formula  to account  for lump-sum
business  taxes.  Denoting  these  taxes by T, we write costs inclusive  of lump-sum  taxes as
C  = C + T. Our final and most general  forn of the decomposition  is then:
(8)  Aln(C )-Aln(QPQ)=O[Aln(C)-AIn(QPQ)]
+ (I1-  @)[A  ln( ) - A  ln(QP59)]
where 9 =  C  is the share  of costs  before lump-sum  taxes  in total costs, and an
C+_T
overbar  denotes  the cross-period  aveiage.  The first right-hand  term is simply  equation  7
weighted  by 9, and the second  term picks  up the effect  of growth  in lump sum taxes
relative  to growth in net revenue.
4.  The Data
Data on costs, sales,  taxes,  tariffs and other  variables  were collected  from roughly
200 Cameroon  firms for the fiscal years 1992-93  and 1994-95. However,  these surveys
did not collect  information  on the prices of inputs  and outputs. Hence,  as part of a
recently  completed  project,  roughly  80 firms  in the RPED data base were re-visited  and
asked for recall information  on the values  and quantities  of their five major inputs and
five major outputs  in both fiscal years.  Only a subset  of 37 firms  was able  to supply
complete  and credible  information;  we will henceforth  refer  to this sub-sample  as the "re-
surveyed"  firms.
16Using this sub-sample, we constructed unit prices for each product by dividing the
value of production by the number of units produced. For example, indexing products by
j, we obtained P,  = Vj,  / Qjt, j = 1, J. Intermediate input prices and the cost of labor were
imputed analogously. The prices were reported inclusive of tariffs and sales taxes, so they
correspond to the P., and Pfi  concepts described above. Tariff data reported by the firms
were augmented with official tariff information  by product line obtained from the
Cameroon government. Hence, we were able to impute A  ln(A2P  ) and
A In(2 1 P, ) using the identities. 10 Finally, with these building blocks, we were able to
solve for the residual scale economy and productivity effect,
I-  )A In Q +  ln C  AIn A.
For the purpose of variable construction, tariffs ( r ) before the reform were
composed of the four types of tariffs (DD, DE, TCAI and TC) for firms operating under
the normal regime, and of the TU or TIP applicable to imports for firms receiving special
privileges. After the reform, tariffs ( r ) included the TEC or TPG. On the other hand, tax
burdens  (t) included the ICAI for firms operating under the normal regime before the
reform and the TU or TIP applicable to local sales for firms operating under a special
regime. After the reform, the indirect tax burden is composed of the TCA. Further
discussion of the data may be found in Tybout et al (1997).
0  An interesting extension would be to exploit data on international prices and isolate growth in X's
from growth in  P  's.
175.  Basic Findings: Pooled Sample
Turning to our findings, let us begin with an overview of the magnitudes of the
different shocks to unit cost. Equation (7') provides the relevant decomposition; it is
empirically rendered in Table 4.
The  general  pattern: For the pooled sample, the increase in unit costs was roughly
8.5 percent. This reflected a substantial increase of 20.2 percent due to commercial policy
reforms, partially offset by residual productivity improvements of 15.2 percent. The
dominant shock the producers faced was therefore trade liberalization, and this was partly
offset by productivity improvements. The productivity gains were not due to scale effects
or improved capacity utilization, on average, because real output did not grow in the
typical firm. (The fact that output did not shrink is surprising, given the extent of the
profit margin squeeze endured by -he firms.) Instead, as we have argued elsewhere,
improved efficiency of input use appears to be part of the story (Tybout et al, 1997).
The effect of trade liberalization is strong because the average nominal tariff rate
on outputs in our sample fell from 68 percent to 27 percent, while the average nominal
tariff rate on inputs fell from 21 percent to 17 percent. In other words, most of the
reduction in protection affected products that the sample firms sold rather than those they
bought. This liberalization effect is also apparent in Table 7, where it can be seen that
traditional effective protection measures fell on average between 80 and 120 percentage
18points, depending on whether all inputs and outputs are treated as perfectly tradable
(upper panel), or whether non-imported inputs are treated as non-tradable (lower panel)."
Table 7 also reveals that the amount of cross-firm dispersion in effective
protection dropped dramatically with the reforms, as intended.  This leveling of the
playing field was largely due to the elimination of special exemptions, as discussed in
section 2 above.
One issue that often arises in Africa is whether the reforms worked at cross
purposes. In the present context, it is interesting to ask whether the tax reform and the
exchange rate devaluation undid the strong signal sent by the commercial policy reforms.
The answer is that on average they did not. The tax reforms actually further increased unit
costs, although their 2.6 percent effect was modest in comparison with that of the
commercial policy reforms. The reason it was not greater is that most of the pre-reform
fiscal privileges took the form of tariff reductions, which have continued to be the
government's primary source of revenue.
If the CFA devaluation had systematically raised or lowered firmns'  gross margins,
this would have been seen under "other relative price effects." On average, however, this
type of shock had almost no effect: manufacturing activities were neither hurt nor helped
on average. The notion that devaluation eased the pain of trade liberalization is therefore
These figures  are not "traditional"  in the sense  that firm-specific  input  shares  are used, rather  than
an economy-wide  input-output  table. In keeping  with  convention,  these  figures  describe  the
percentage change in value-added (rather than the percentage change in cost per unit revenue), so
neither set of calculations is directly comparable to the fourth column of Table 4. Specifically, the
percentage change in costs due to tariff reforms has been divided by the share of value-added in gross
output.
19not supported by our findings.  Nonetheless, the real devaluation did considerably change
the returns to tradable versus non-tradable goods production, as we will discuss shortly.
Simple averages across firms are sensitive to outliers, and assign disproportionate
weight to small firms.  Accordingly, we also examined output-weighted averages and
medians to determine whether these basic results are robust. The results, reported in
Tables 5 and 6, confirm that the commercial policy, tax policy, relative price and residual
productivity figures remain very similar when we use medians, although the median
output growth is -10.3 percent. Output-weighted figures produce a similar picture,
although the they exhibit cost-increasing relative price effects (10.3 percent), offset by
larger residual productivity growth (23.5 percent).
6.  Dissaggregated Findings
Exporters vs. Non-exporters: Breakdowns by sector reveal that, on average, firms
that were exporting in 1992-93 repor:ed relatively modest unit cost growth (6.1 percent
compared to 9.7 percent for non exporters), even though the direct effects of the
commercial policy reforms were mowe  favorable to non-exporters. The exporters gained
ground mainly because relative price effects reduced their unit costs by 10.9 percent,
while they increased unit costs for non-exporter by 6.4 percent. This probably reflected
the 100 percent CFAF devaluation against the French Franc that took place between the
sample years, and possibly also some general equilibrium effects on export prices due to
the commercial policy reforms.
If we divide the firms according to whether they exported in 1994/95, the contrast
is more dramatic. Exporters registered a unit cost growth of only 2.3 percent, compared
20with 13.3 percent for non-exporters. Furthermore, 1994/95 exporters showed a
productivity increase of 27.4 percent and an output growth of 21.2 percent. Hence, only
firms that exported under the new regime showed unusually rapid output and productivity
growth. Qualitatively, the same picture emerges from output-weighted averages and
medians, although the results on productivity growth vary with the type of summary
statistic. The fact that firms exporting at the end of the sample period did better than firms
exporting at the beginning of the sample period probably reflects self-selection effects.
Firms that experienced cost reductions tended to begin exporting, and those that
experienced cost increases tended to cease (Clerides, et al, 1998). It also suggests that the
pre-reform incentive structure induced a number of firms to export products that were not
to the country's comparative advantage.
Imported Input-intensive Firms: Producers who relied fairly heavily on imported
inputs fared better than those that did not, although the contrast was not dramatic. As one
might expect, this difference is partly attributable to the fact that the former group was
hurt less by the commercial policy reforms. One reason we do not record larger
disparities is simply that the net tariff effect presumes perfect arbitrage between domestic
and imported inputs. Hence, regardless of whether firmns  actually imported their inputs,
they are assumed to benefit equally from liberalization-induced price reductions.' 2
The output-weighted figures tell a different story than the unweighted means
about the relative performances of the two sets of firms.  They show larger cost increases
12  If there is imperfect substitutabi  I  ity between domestically produced and imported intermediates, this
should show up in other relative price effects. But these price effects also favored firms that relied on
21for import-intensive producers, and smaller cost increases for domestic input-intensive
producers. However, the contrast does not trace to direct commercial policy or fiscal
policy effects. It is due to other relative price effects, which are sensitive to whether
averages are weighted because large import-intensive firms experienced major adverse
shocks.
Sector-based Breakdowns. In terms of sectors, wood sector firns,  on average,
recorded a larger unit cost growth, with a 23 percent increase. This finding traces to a
large commercial policy-based reduc:ion in output prices, which more than offset the
relatively large improvements in pre-tariff relative prices and relatively small domestic
tax effects. Output-weighted averages and median figures reveal that larger wood sector
firms fared better than smaller ones, making sector-wide  output growth positive.
In the food sector, weighted averages and median figures indicate that larger food
sector firms endured a substantial increase in unit costs. Despite a smaller commercial
policy impact on the food sector and larger productivity gains than in other sectors, it was
hit more severely by (pre-tariff) rela Live  price effects, which increased unit costs by
39.9% (output-weighted). Textiles and metal products experienced relatively modest cost
increases, despite substantial reductions in protection, partly because they realized large
productivity gains. (See Table 7.)
domestic inputs over those that were import-intensive,  suggesting that other factors are at work as
well.
227.  Summary and Conclusions
To summarize, we have quantified several basic changes in the incentive structure
that resulted when a maxi-devaluation was accompanied by substantial tariff reductions
and a major simplification in the tax structure. First, the combined effect of these changes
in the economic enviromnent was to increase costs per unit revenue by 20 percent at the
median firm, and by 9 percent on average. This constitutes a major change in the return to
manufacturing activities, and it is somewhat remarkable that output did not contract.
Second, the dominant force behind these reductions in gross profit margins was a
substantial drop in the rate of nominal protection for firns'  final products.  Since
protection levels on imported intermediate goods were relatively modest before the
reforns,  unifying the tariff structure mainly meant bringing down tariffs on final goods,
thereby reducing effective protection rates by somewhere between 80 and 120 percentage
points.  The cross-firm dispersion in effective protection rates also fell markedly.
Accordingly, despite the presence of other shocks, Cameroon's trade reforms appear to
have created clear new signals for manufacturers.
Third, substantial productivity growth cushioned the effects of the trade
liberalization on profit margins. The unweighted average rate of productivity growth was
15.2 percent in the pooled sample, and the weighted average was 23.5 percent. As we
have documented elsewhere, at least part of the explanation seems to be that firms
economized on intermediate inputs (Tybout et al, 1997).
In contrast to trade liberalization, neither the tax reforms nor the CFA devaluation
had a major systematic effect on profit margins. For most firms, the new tax code
23increased after-tax costs per unit revenue by several percentage points, and the changes in
relative prices not directly linked to taxes or tariffs had an even smaller net effect for the
average firm. Nonetheless, the CFA devaluation did twist relative prices dramatically in
favor of exportable goods, and firms that directed their output toward foreign markets
exhibited relatively rapid output growh. Here too, then, the intended shift in incentives
clearly registered at the ground level.
Overall, our firm-level panel data have allowed us to measure the effects of the
policy reforms on different types of firms with considerably more precision and detail
than aggregate data afford. Accordingly, we hope that this study provide a useful
methodological example for researchers and policy makers concerned with the
consequences of related reform packages elsewhere.
24Table 4: Commercial Policy, Tax Reform, and Unit Production Costs (Equation 7)
Unweighted Averages
net unit  tar  iff effect,  tariff effect,  effective  Other  residual  domestic  real output
cost  outputs  inputs  protection  relative  productivity  tax  growth
Industry  growth  (i)  (ii  effect  price  effects  effects
(i)+(ii)  effects
Food  0.094  0.172  ~~~~~~~~---0.026  0.146  0.113  -0Z.189  0059.4
Textiles  0.029  0.243  0.008  0.250  -0.089  -0.161  0.029  0.219
wood products  0.230  0.355  0.000  0.355  -0.084  -0.049  0.007  0.004
metal products  0.063  0.216  -0.017  0.179  -0.027  -0.125  0.035  -0.335
Domestic Input  0.104  0.238  -0.005  0.232  -0.062  -0.088  0.022  0.192
Intensive
Imported Input  0.067  0.202  -0.030  0.173  0.076  -0.212  0.030  -0.200
Intensive
uNon-Exporters 92-  0.097  0.209  -0.02 1  0.188  0.064  -0.177  0.020  0.053
93
Exporters 92-93  0.061  0.241  -0.010  0.230  -0.109  -0.100  0.039  -0.139
Non-Exporters 94-95  0.133  -0.198  -0.019  0.179  -0.011  -0.058  0.025  -0.177
Exporters 94-95  0.023  -0.249  -0.016  0.233  0.035  -0.274  0.029  0.212
Small  0.053  0.239  -0.020  0.219  0.024  -0.210  0.021  0.084
Medium  0.064  0.201  -0.016  0.185  -0.038  -0.113  0.031  -0.103
Large  0.185  0.208  -0.016  0.193  0.047  -0.086  0.031  -0.066
Total  0.085  0.220  -0.017  0.202  0.009  -0.152  0.027  -0.009
25Table 5: Commercial Policy, Tax Reform, and Unit Production Costs (Equation 7)
Output Weighted Averages
net unit  tarif  effect,  Tariff  effective  Other  residual  domestic  real output
cost  outputs  effect,  protection  relative  productivity  tax  growth
Industry  growth  (i)  inputs  effect  price  effects  effects
(iiJ  ()+(i)i)  effe ts
Food  -0.291  0.172  -0.043  0.129  0.399  -0.262  0.025  0.090
Textiles  -0.070  0.269  0.009  0.278  -0.110  -0.258  0.021  0.133
woodproducts  0.080  0.355  0.000  0.355  -0.107  -0.177  0.008  0.091
metalproducts  0.018  0.378  -0.011  0.367  -0.244  -0.135  0.030  -0.242
Domestic Input  0.009  0.264  -0.017  0.247  -0.092  -0.171  0.025  0.216
Intensive
Imported Input  0.198  0.231  -0.021  0.210  0.246  -0.283  0.024  -0.093
Intensive
Non-Exporters 92-93  0.249  0.118  -0.038  0.080  0.548  -0.396  0.016  0.140
Exporters 92-93  0.049  0.312  -0.010  0.302  -0.131  -0.151  0.029  -0.015
Non-Exporters 94-95  0.253  0.125  -0.035  0.091  0.108  0.021  0.033  -0.196
Exporters 94-95  0.080  0.278  -0.015  0.026  0.101  -0.306  0.022  0.103
Small  0.204  0.175  -0.038  0.137  0.165  -0.128  0.030  -0.261
Medium  0.137  0.191  -0.016  0.175  0.389  -0.447  0.021  0.171
Large  0.103  0.277  -0.020  0.257  -0.049  -0.131  0.026  -0.015
Total  0.118  0.245  -0.020  0.226  0.103  -0.235  0.025  0.038
26Table 6: Commercial Policy, Tax Reform, and Unit Production Costs (Equation 7)
Medians
net unit  tariff effect,  tariffeffect,  effective  other  residual  domestic  real output
cost  outputs  inputs  protection  relative  productivity  tax  growth
Industry  growth  (i)  (ii)  effect  price  effects  effects
(i)+(ii)  effects
Food  0.336  0.203  -0.012  0.148  0.115  0.046  0.011  -0.103
Textiles  0.143  0.244  0.000  0.244  -0.052  -0.248  0.027  0.117
woodproducts  0.130  0.356  0.000  0.356  -0.081  -0.176  0.000  0.032
metalproducts  0.205  0.213  -0.030  0.180  -0.012  -0.144  0.024  -0.315
Domestic Input  0.156  0.244  -0.000  0.238  -0.029  -0.187  0.009  0.083
Intensive
Imported Input  0.278  0.215  -0.020  0.213  0.147  -0.030  0.018  -0.313
Intensive
Non-Exporters 92-93  0.278  0.215  -0.008  0.215  0.079  -0.038  0.004  0.002
Exporters 92-93  0.022  0.271  -0.001  0.262  -0.157  -0.151  0.042  -0.151
Non-Exporters 94-95  0.324  0.215  -0.000  0.215  0.027  0.046  0.009  -0.298
Exporters 94-95  0.001  0.255  -0.012  0.254  0.026  -0.257  0.021  0.167
Small  0.205  0.233  0.000  0.215  0.030  -0.155  0.004  0.018
Medium  0.182  0.179  -0.013  0.186  -0.093  -0.094  0.017  -0.094
Large  0.259  0.243  -0.004  0.246  0.078  -0.117  0.027  -0.162
Total  0.205  0.233  -0.003  0.229  0.027  -0.144  0.011  -0.103
27Table 7: Traditional Effective Rates of Protection
Unweighted Averages and Standard Deviations
Metal &  Domestic  Imported
Wood  Metal  Non  Input  Input
ALL  Food  Textile  Product Product  Exporters  Exporter  Intensive  Intensive  Small  Medium  Large
Number offirms  34  14  9  4  7  24  10  18  16  16  11  7
Only imports
Mean  1.6  1.46  1.83  2.27  1.18  1.58  1.65  1.73  1.45  1.84  1.6  1.04
ERP:  Std.  0.9  0.94  1.01  0.5  0.64  0.87  1.02  0.7  1.08  0.79  1.06  0.69
92-93  Max.  4.02  3.2  4.02  2.88  2.21  3.2  4.02  3.2  4.02  3.2  4.02  2.45
Min.  0.22  0.22  0.7  1.79  0.45  0.22  0.7  0.7  0.22  0.22  0.52  0.3
Mean  0.59  0.68  0.51  0.8  0.42  0.69  0.37  0.73  0.45  0.78  0.4  0.46
ERP:  Std.  0.34  0.4  0.26  0.17  0.27  0.34  0.19  0.33  0.28  0.36  0.26  0.08
94-95  Max.  1.69  1.69  0.94  1.01  0.79  1.69  0.66  1.69  1.2  1.69  0.96  0.59
Min.  0.1  0.23  0.1  0.63  0.11  0.23  0.1  0.31  0.1  0.23  0.1  0.37
All inputs as
Mean  1.15  0.92  1.62  1.09  1.02  1.01  1.48  0.96  1.35  1.08  1.34  0.98
ERP:  Std.  0.81  0.67  1.14  0.25  0.66  0.67  1.05  0.46  1.07  0.68  1.04  0.75
92-93  Max.  4.02  2.33  4.02  1.46  2.21  2.33  4.02  2.29  4.02  2.29  4.02  2.54
Min.  0.24  0.24  0.49  0.92  0.45  0.24  0.58  0.3  0.24  0.24  0.41  0.26
Mean  0.35  0.37  0.36  0.29  0.34  0.39  0.25  0.33  0.37  0.4  0.26  0.37
ERP:  Std.  0.17  0.15  0.18  0.03  0.25  0.14  0.2  0.14  0.2  0.16  0.16  0.19
94-95  Max.  0.79  0.68  0.61  0.32  0.79  0.79  0.61  0.68  0.79  0.79  0.46  0.61
Min.  0.03  0.03  0.1  0.25  0.07  0.23  0.03  0.03  0.07  0.23  0.07  0.03
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30APPENDIX
Fiscal and commercial policy before 1994's
Prior to 1994,  firms  that did not enjoy  access  to any of the special  programs  (UDEAC-
wide or Cameroon) were subject to the following direct and indirect (sales) taxes:
a)  Impot sur le chiffre d'affaires interieur (ICAI): Businesses in all the UDEAC  countries were
subject to a domestic sales tax. The ICAI in Cameroon was generally levied at a rate of 10.9
percent on sales value, but a reduced rate of 4.5 percent and a special rate of 2.5 percent for
bakeries also existed.'4
b)  Impot sur les bngefices industriels et commerciaux (BIC) and Imp6t minimum  forfaitaire
(IMF): Cameroon businesses were also required to pay a company tax comprising the highest
of the following taxes: (i) the BIC, a tax on profits imposed at a rate of 38.5 percent
(including a 10 percent communal tax) for incorporated businesses and 24.2 percent for
unincorporated businesses; (ii) a 1 percent tax on sales; and (iii) the IMF, a minimum
presumptive tax." 5
c)  Contribution des patentes.  In addition, Cameroon businesses were required to pay a patente,
a kind of business license fee collected annually to help finance local governments. This tax
was based on broad business activity indicators (output, equipment, number of employees).
d)  Impot special sur les societes: Cameroonian corporations were subject to a special tax on
corporations, applied to capital at rates varying between 0.5 percent and 1.5 percent. A variety
of other registration fees and taxes were also applicable. These included a registration fee for
corporate charters (DESCA and DESBI) charged at a rate of between 0.25 percent and 2
percent, according to the firm's level of capital; and a proportional tax on income from
securities (Taxe proportionnelle sur les revenues de capitaux mobiliers, TPRCM) for
corporations paying dividends or fees to associates and shareholders. Residents were charged
16.5 percent and non-residents 25 percent. Other taxes included duties on property leases,
labor housing rental, stamp duties, advertising fees, together with tax licences on land, mining
and forests.
13  This section is based on World Bank (1992, 1995) and Gauthier  and Gersovitz (1997)
4  The ICAI was a cascading  tax, since  it was imposed  on the value of the good or service at each level of the
production process, and not only on the value-added.  This cascading effect meant that production tax
increased with the number of intermediaries.
15  Businesses in their first two years of operation were  exempt from the IMF (600,000 CFAF) and 1 percent  tax
although they  had  to pay  the  BIC.  During years  3  and  4,  their  IMF and  1 percent  tax  obligations  were
reduced by half.
31e)  Finally, Cameroon corporations were  ;ubject  to taxes on insurance contracts, trade union
income tax, an apprenticeship tax and various community taxes.
Producers subject to full taxation wvho  engaged in international trade faced the following
additional fiscal obligations:
a)  Imports of intermediate goods were subject to four taxes, the first three dictated by UDEAC
norms, and the fourth created by Cam -roon. The Droits de Douanes (DD) was applied at rates
varying from 5 percent to 30 percent on all products, regardless of origin. The Droits d'Entrie
(DE) also applied to all products and origins, with rates varying between 5 percent and 90
percent, although certain goods were exempt. The Taxe sur le chiffre d'affaires a
l'importation (TCAI) was imposed at a rate of 10 percent of the CFAF value plus DD+DE.
Finally, the Taxe complementaire a 1',  mportation (TC) was charged ad valorem, with rates
varying between 0 and 100 percent.
b)  Imports were also subject to other taxes, including an unloading fee, a municipal tax, a tax
imposed by the Conseil national des chargeurs, a tax on meat inspection, a veterinary tax,
and a special tax on fuel.
Special treatment from the tax au;horities was available to manufacturers through a
variety of mechanisms, on a case-by-case basis. These included:
a)  Tax unique (TU) Originally designed as a means of encouraging industrialization and trade
between UDEAC countries, the TU offered firms several advantages. Qualifying firms were
exempt from the domestic sales tax ([CAI), which was replaced by a firm-specific TU rate.
The TU rate also replaced the tariff system. Furthermore, the TU granted preferential access
to export markets in other UDEAC countries, since products were exempt from duties.
Finally, neither the ICAI nor the TU tax were collected on sales to other firms with TU status.
TU rates were negotiated on a firm-specific basis, and different firms may thus have paid
different rates for the same product. [n addition, the same firm would pay different rates on its
products, depending on the country to which they were exported. To obtain TU status, firms
applied to the Management Commiiv.ee  of the UDEAC Secretariat.
b)  Taxe Interieure a la Production (TIP') Since access to the TU proved difficult, Cameroon
created a domestically-administered variant. This special regime also provided sales tax and
tariff advantages, but in contrast to the TU, it did not give preferential access to the UDEAC
market. Benefits and rates were negotiated with the Cameroon Ministry of Finance instead of
with UDEAC.
c)  Investment Code.  Major tax conces  3ions  were also available under the Investment Code (IC).
The IC was augmented in 1990 with the help of FIAS and USAID, and provided tax
32exemptions and reductions for firms meeting the Code criteria. Five different schemes
existed: the basic regime, the small and medium-sized enterprise regime, the strategic
enterprise regime, the reinvestment regime and the free trade zone regime (see below)." 6 In
contrast to the TU/TIP rates, which could be negotiated with the authorities, IC benefits were
supposedly non-negotiable. However, benefits under the TU/TIP and IC regimes were not
mutually exclusive. Thus a firm could benefit under more than one scheme at once.
d)  Zone Franc and Point Franc Free trade zones (FTZ) were part of the Investment Code in
1990, but were covered by separate legislation and administered by a separate organization.
To be eligible for a FTZ, a firm had to export 80 percent of its output and its activities had to
be eligible for the basic Investment Code regime.  The firm itself had to be located in an
industrial free zone or be designated "Point  franc  industriel" (factory-specific free zone) if it
needed to be adjacent to raw material. Free trade status brought full exemption from
international and indirect taxes, and profit taxes were imposed at a reduced rate.
e)  Convention Speciale (CS) Firms that did not find special tax schemes suited to their own
specific needs could negotiate directly with the Ministry of Finance to establish a Convention
speciale (special agreement). No guidelines existed regarding the benefits and exemptions
available under such agreements, and in theory a firm could have obtained full exemption
from all tax obligations, including the Patente, for its lifetime.  This unusual tax scheme was
generally reserved for public or very large enterprises.
The Fiscal Environment After 1994
Decrees were adopted in Cameroon on January 24, 1994, to implement the fiscal and
trade reforms. These reforms included four components affecting external trade:
a)  Tarif exterieur commun (TEC) The four-types of tariffs were replaced by a unified single
system known as the TEC, applicable to imports from non-UDEAC countries. Also, all
external trade privileges under the Investment Code and special production regimes (TU, TIP,
Conventions d'etablissement) were eliminated.
b)  Imports were classified into four categories, with tariff rates ranging from 5 percent to 30
percent, compared with rates ranging from 0 percent to 500 percent under the previous
system.
16  For more details  on the eligibility  criteria and the benefits  associated  with each regime, see RPED (1993a),
Table 5, Appendix  C.
33c)  Tarifpreferentiel generalise (TPG) A general preferential tariff was introduced for trade
between UDEAC countries, with an initial rate fixed at 20 percent of the applicable TEC."'
d)  A mechanism was created for charging a temporary surtax of not more than 30 percent on a
set of products previously covered by q[uantitative  restrictions and a list of designated
products.
With respect to indirect taxes, the ieform essentially replaced the various sales taxes with
a value-added tax, and eliminated special privileges. The specific measures were:
a)  The elimination of all indirect tax privileges under the special production regimes (TU, TIP,
Conventions d'etablissement) and the ::nvestment  Code, except the Free Trade Zone.
b)  The introduction of a "Taxe sur le chil'fre  d'affaire" (TCA) (sales tax), a quasi-VAT tax
applicable to domestic production and to imported inputs and intermediates, replacing the
former sales and production tax (ICA], TU, TIP). Three categories of products were specified:
those subject to the normal rate (12.5 percent, increasing to 15 percent on January 1, 1995,
and to 17 percent in 1996), those subjcct to the reduced rate (5 percent, increasing to 8 percent
on January 1, 1995) and exempted goods.' 8
c)  The creation of a mechanism for appl  ying excise taxes to certain products.
On February 1, 1994, the reform went into force for firms governed by the common law
system. Firms receiving special fiscal privileges were allowed a transition period. Those
governed by the IC, TU and TIP were not subject to the new regime until the 1994-1995 fiscal
year (beginning July 1, 1994). Firms governed by special agreements were given until December
31, 1995, to regularize their situation. TLis period of negotiation was later extended to March 31,
1996.
17  This  rate was to be reduced  to 10  percent  on January 1 1996  and 0 percent on January 1 1998.
18  We use the term "quasi" because  firms initially  paid taxes  on their purchases,  then periodically  applied  to the
government  for reimbursement.
34Notably, the reformns  left the free trade zone (FTZ) intact. Hence, qualifying firms
continue to enjoy full exemption from import duties and TCA, and are excused from income
taxes in the first 10 ten years of their existence.' 9 Also, exporters not in the FTZ can apply for
refunds of a portion of the customs they pay on imported inputs. The fraction refundable is equal
to the share of their total sales exported outside the UDEAC. However, given the inefficiency of
the administration and the delays in paying tax credits, this benefit has proved of little use to
marginal exporters.
9  Firms that already  existed  before  the creation  of the FTZ pay an income  tax of 15 percent instead  of the
normal  rate (38.5 percent).
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